Early Days
Atlantic Coast Airlines(DH) has split from its original holding company in Fresno and from the route map archived below you can see that the fleet still wears the first generation UEX livery. New is the De Havilland Dash 8 and BAe Jetstream 41 to fulfill expansion opportunities afforded by marketing partner United Airlines.
The Dash 8 aircraft (and pilots) were transferred from United’s storied Air Wisconsin Airlines(DX) affiliate and with them came baggage.
Air Wisconsin another United code-share, as the story goes, had used precious CASH to acquire its fleet of British Aerospace ATPs and with an economic downturn had become strapped for operating capital. United stepped in and acquired the company. Far from being a rescue United was most keen on retaining [DX] Chicago O’Hare gates, the crown jewel. Air Wisconsin’s BAe 146-300 jet fleet was promptly spun off and the other half of that group (Dash 8 fleet) divested, came to ACA.
Welcome to ACA. Troubled, disgruntled and militant flight crews having felt that they’d been hosed and not happy to have involuntarily landed at Atlantic Coast. Also this aircraft type was not a complimentary fit. It was very expensive to operate and redundant against the also complex EMB-120 on property.
In short order ACA was in financial stress and was about to miss payroll. British Aerospace with deep pockets appeared in the hour of need. By shotgun, BAe would take both the De Havilland and Brasilia fleets in disposal trade while ACA would submit to becoming the USA launch customer for their new BAe Jetstream 4100 aircraft. The leasing and capital infusion setup was a life line.
Mid-Life
In 1997, a crisis of sorts: Atlantic Airlines wanted to rid itself of the unloved obsolete prop-planes to fly the latest in the new to the industry 50 passenger seat jets.
Costs spread across 19 and 29 seat aircraft were increasingly disadvantageous. Regional Jets from Bombardier and Embraer where coming online and code-share managements were convinced that passengers would readily adopt them and buy flight tickets. One problem; the pilots at United Airlines were deadest against and union contracts gave them leverage to put the brakes on. Regional pilots had zero say. The UAL pilots were (rightfully) concerned about agency and they saw these smaller jets as the proverbial camel’s nose under the tent. Eventually concessions would take place but even so it wasn’t cart blanche for the regional partners.
Anxious with anticipation and perhaps to pressure United, ACA jumped the gun went forward anyway and placed an order for 52 jets. A green light from United was not immediate. Nevertheless delivered aircraft arrived with the early ones painted in an ACA color scheme – not United’s — as if ACA was determined to operate the planes regardless.
The new jets were not sidelined for long. With alleviated discord, these aircraft were repainted with the United Express logo and everyone carried on. At the end of the day Atlantic Coast Airlines would operate 87 RJs, an all jet fleet system wide, but in hindsight; Oh the passengers… These small jets too were seen as cramped and uncomfortable. Like the propeller driven craft that they replaced they were only tolerated. Most preferred flying the mainline jets.
Final Hours
Following the September 11 attack and economic downturn UAL was facing financial struggles. All of ACA income was dependent upon the health and welfare of its parent. There wasn’t much hand-wringing circa 2002 about United’s fate. Everyone understood the bankruptcy process to be requisite formality from which United would emerge whole. In fact, when the ACA team confidently went forth to renegotiate their revenue agreement they fully anticipated to be handed a better deal i.e. more mainline flying route discards.
Regional carriers operate under capacity purchase agreements, where United paid fixed and performance-based fees and covered costs like fuel and landing fees, while managing sales pricing, revenue, and loyalty programs.
This did not happen. United bluntly dashed their high hopes and sent them home for reflection. United wasn’t doing direct negotiations. This was turned over to a faceless 3rd party hired solely to cut costs to the bone. Fees being paid to regional feeders would be severely curtailed.
With diligence ACA leadership came to the realization that United’s new deal would bleed out company profits which would lead to ruin. There was an alternative — divorce. Management’s thinly disguised ambitions eluded to in the deployment of the CRJ program earlier was a clue. With bravado and audacity they believed they could go it alone. ACA had accumulated their multi year profits into a war chest which they would deploy against their former partner. They believed that as a discount airline they could compete on United’s turf.
Such a plan would be a risky enterprise. The rank and file thought it suicidal but a plan was hatched. Atlantic Coast Airline dba United Express gave notice. The legacy and logo would be cast away and the company re-invented fittingly rebranded as Independence Air.