Fun fact I leaarned of Juan Browne’s channel. blancolirio was actually his [Spanish] wife’s youtube channel which he borrowed when he began citizen journalist reporting of the Oroville Dam catastrophe. Popularity ensued and it became kind of difficult to jump after that.

I listened to his ATC audio of the Midway runway incursion this morning and have some observations. The Flex crew did right by getting clarification on initial taxi clearance before they even started moving at the FBO. Contributing to their initial confusion: the taxi instruction began with a new departure frequency. This is not unusual but the controller should have waited for a readback on the new freq and THEN proceeded with the taxi clearance. Contributing to the fluster, the controller asked them what taxiway they were going to exit the ramp to. The pilots weren’t prepared for that question to give an immediate answer. So train of thought disrupted they got their first set of taxi instructions jumbled. Off on the wrong foot so to speak. When they got the clearance the SIC misspoke reading back 13 instead of 31 which the controller caught and correctly restated so that it was crystal clear.

Dyslexia with runway numbers happens more frequently than one might think — symptomatic of not enough sleep or caffeine.

The SIC however, read that final clearance back abbreviated saying “cross 31L and hold short“. Technically he should have read back the name of the rwy he was to hold short of but the controller let that go. This speaks to a busy ATC system.

I can address how we were trained to handle taxi instructions. It begins with a briefing before calling ground control. The briefing is a deliberate part of a before engine start flow. The SIC gets the ATIS and ATC route clearance and loads the [FMS] box. During the subsequent briefing this info is exchanged and discussed. Besides local Wx, the ATIS provides the landing and departing rwys. So you can see that before the pax show up the crew can pre-brief their location relative to their departure rwy and pre-view possible taxi routes. That way when the real taxi clearance does come it’s not out of the blue. Finally, when it’s time for the SIC to call ground he would have pen and paper at hand too transcribe the taxi clearance as it is verbalized to him. At the end of the transmission the SIC reads the clearance back to the controller from what he wrote down. Before the PIC starts movement both pilots can be heads down as necessary to confirm what they both heard. They both can briefly look at the chart and make sure the clearance makes sense and is clear. While taxiing, the PIC is “eyes outside” and navigating and it’s upon him not to deviate. The SIC should be monitoring and maintaining situational awareness.

A good PIC will actually parrot a revised taxi instruction to the SIC so that the SIC has confidence that the PIC (who is steering) is in the loop. ATC does revise clearances on the fly so if at any point the PIC is unsure of himself, and the SIC isn’t sure, he stops the aircraft until resolution with ATC. In a busy environment this may just irritate ATC, but the pilots know that once they’ve acknowledged a clearance, they own it and deviating from it is a bust.

When crossing ANY runway, active and inactive, both pilots are to look out their respective side windows and SEE that nobody is coming.

It would be of interest to know where the sun was in relation to the SWA and the eyes of the SIC. It’s possible for that time of day for the SWA to be coming out of the sun. Answer: https://grok.com/share/bGVnYWN5_acce359e-a637-4377-bcff-2d5136c20b4e

This too is verbalized with SIC saying “clear right” and the PIC “clear left – clear to cross”. (Exact phrases are monumented in company procedures verbatim) Additionally, all external lights are switched on prior to the crossing and then reconfigured after crossing. I don’t know if Flex has procedures or if they were followed but they worked fairly well for us. Statistical data shows runway incursion as a common human error point and all of these routines have been put in place to mitigate.

The Go-Around

Quite the impressive quick reaction and execution by the SWA crew! Analyzing the event Juan Browne claimed that the SWA crew initiated the Go-around on their own and that part is true. ATC did not issue that directive per se. Looking at the timing in the replay from the security camera, the SWA was definitely spring loaded. But it couldn’t have been certain what Flex was about to do…

The part we didn’t get to hear (nor did the Flex crew) was ATC keying up on ground frequency last instant, to tell Flex to STOP! Since a 3rd aircraft was concurrently transmitting on ground, (VHF radio is Simplex) that crucial last effort call to stave Flex was blocked. You can tell somebody walked on the transmission because to the receiving aircraft the sound is garbled.

But simultaneously, ATC also transmitted “Flexjet STOP!” (or words to that effect) on the tower frequency which was clear channel and that’s all that SWA needed to hear. Off they flew and good on them. SWA was faultless in this obviously and ATC can’t be blamed as they were mostly by the book. Pilots and controllers both are tying to expedite commerce in limited airspace that is too busy. Human errors are to be expected but within a task saturated outmoded legacy system trouble comes.

Proceed at a Professional Pace

Ernest K. Gann’s novel/screenplay The High and the Mighty (1954) sensationalized a peril of crew (and passengers!) after a mechanical mishap on a trans-Pacific flight. The theme of the movie introduced we laypeople audience to the dramatized concept Hollywood named: The Point of No Return — when to turn back or commit to journey onward.

Today’s arithmetic has the benefit of digital calculation. No longer are there margins of error induced by the width of pencil lead on paper chart. It behooves a pilot to maintain an awareness of where he is and specific to this discussion, a safe path to alternative landing [at a suitable airport] should the trip need to end prematurely. Our pre-flight planning analysis arms us with reliable forethought to avoid reliance upon gut instinct or seat of pants.

Note: With a single engine aircraft a diversion could be an open field or stretch of road that gliding distance will allow. So, you as pilot are always reliant upon senses of judgment. Good Luck, we're all counting on you. 

A high flying jet however will have options. Over water operations is more problematic but the objective is to; always have a successful outcome. A line for decision may be more comprehensible as a measured distance but is more a function of timing. The fact is; it is not called Point of No Return… rather; Equal Time Point (ETP). This is the precise moment where it takes the same amount of time to u-turn so to speak or press forward. Not displayed but accounted for are winds and temperature conditions at cruising altitude. Consider that it may be a shorter measured distance one direction mileage wise but if facing stiff opposing winds aloft it may take longer to fly them. A longer distance mileage wise might be flown more rapidly then that of the shorter with tailwinds. So, there is a computed point in time where a logical decision is reached.

There can be multiple on a long over-water route. On a recent 10+ hour hop we plotted 4 ETPs. Actually 12. Within each of the 4 groupings are 3 types. DEPRESS (depressurization), 1ENGINE (loss of engine), and MEDICAL (onboard medical emergency). Observe the dispatch release beginning with ETP 1 through 4 below:

The second box, highlighted group, ETP2, contains two airports deemed suitable. In this case: PACD (Cold Bay Airport) in the Aleutians and PMDY (Henderson Field) on Midway Atoll. As you surmise these are in the middle of ‘nowhere’, beyond mainland US and short of our intended final destination. These alternates will change as we progress and thus there are subsequent ETP groupings.

Loss of cabin pressurization is a critical one. At these high altitudes one can’t function physiologically for very long without supplemental O². An immediate decent to an altitude deemed survivable is necessary. 15,000 feet is the generally accepted. Unfortunately doing so will double the rate of aircraft fuel consumption. Jets fly the icy upper levels for reasons of speed and economy. When forced to fly in the dense lower atmosphere efficiency is lost and whereas we planned for optimum fuel now we will end up short. Thus, the need for an escape plan. There is not enough fuel to continue on oblivious so as we are decending we are also questioning our route. Have we reached our ETP?

I plotted ETP(s) on a digital chart for easy reference in-flight. See the screen-grab below:

Observe DEP2, a plotted waypoint along this westbound (the blue line) route. It is located using Latitude and Longitude. A (black) arrow line vector shows the approximate direction to turn. PACD is a right turn to roughly North and, if past the DEP2 waypoint, PMDY will be found to the South West. These alternate airports are already pre-loaded into the box (nav system) so a route change can be actuated quickly with a button press or two and crew confirmation.

A curious eye will see ? 37N160 in chart center and also 0730z atop a magenta flag marker. The latter is known as a “10 minute check” — a timed event. The label is 07:30 UTC along with an actual lat/lon position report and is created enroute to compare with the plotted route. It serves as a reality check for navigational compliance accuracy. It is noted 10 minutes after passing the previous fix which depicted in shorthand is at North 37 degrees 160 West.

Armed with computerized clarity we are less vulnerable and don’t face the dilemma that our performers faced on the silver screen. Great aviation movie classic BTW and — spoiler alert — our High and the Mighty live happily ever after.